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feated in the semi-finals by University of Texas. Southern Metho-
dist took top honors, University of Texas won second.
STumIr BAR AssocIATIoN: The University of Tulsa Student Bar
Association was named the outstanding Student Bar in the state
by the Oklahoma Bar Association. The officers are: David Field
James, President; Robert L. Funston, Vice President; Ronnie Main,
Secretary and Kenneth Ellison, Treasurer. David Field James also
was selected by the Oklahoma Bar Association as Outstanding Stu-
dent at the University of Tulsa.
UN=nE STATES DisTmcr ATTromY's STUDENT TRAn-aI lhio-
GRAM: This program was adopted during the summer session to al-
low the student an opportunity to observe and participate in the
functions of the Department of Justice. Stan Pierce Doyle and Wil-
liam Bruckner served during the summer session and Kelly Dee
Young and James Pohl are presently serving.
CRIMINAL LAW: OKLAHOMA'S INDETERMINATE
SENTENCE AcT
The writings criticizing and suggesting revisions in the laws
of criminal justice administration are legion.1 All such writers
on criminal law administration, agree on at least one point,
if no other, that equal justice under the law is a must. The
Senate Judiciary Committee comments "that the existence of wide
disparities [in sentencing] casts doubt upon the evenhandedness
of justice and discourages a respect for the law."2
George H. Boldt, Judge, United States District Court, District
of Washington stated: "All the available data on sentences clearly
disclose an appalling lack of 'equal justice under the law' in
sentences in all categories of crime: by area, by court, by judge,
by defendant, and by every conceivable criterion of comparison."a
Part of the problem relative to inflexible determinate sen-
tencing lies in the fact that convicts are released if they have
served the time imposed by the court whether they are reformed
or not. Release from prison of such a person defeats the primary
purpose of criminal laws. The objective of all criminal laws is
the protection of society, and such purpose should also apply to
criminal sentences. 4
Then, of course, the opposite situation, equally unfair is the
I E.g., Boldt, Recent Trends in Criminal Sentencing, Am. Crm. LAw Q.,
vol. 1, no. 4 at 5 (1963); Schwartz, The Model Penal Code: An Invitation
to Law Reform, 49 A.B.A.J. 447 (1963); Lumbard, The Administration of
Criminal justice: Some Problems and Their Resolution, 49 A.B.AJ. 845
(1963).
2 30 F.R.D. 413-415. The Seminar and Institute on Disparity of Sen-
tence was authorized by Public Law on August 25, 1958. The law stated
as its purpose "the studying, discussing, and formulating the objectives
policies, standards and criteria for sentencing those convicted of crimes and
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convict who has not served "his time", yet by any reasonable
standard -has reformed and should be returned to society.5 Cur-
rent determinate sentencing does not and cannot take into don-
sideration these problems. Parole or retention of prisoners is
certainly a worthy attempt at correcting these evils, but serious
weaknesses, inherent in parole laws, negative much of the hoped
for benefits from them.
On May 21, 1963, the twenty-ninth legislature of the State
of Oklahoma approved,
"An Act relating to criminal procedure; providing for in-
determinate sentence by fixing eligibility of parole at tine
of sentence and providing juries may assess term confine-
ment within limits of law; fixing time for parole board hear-
ig; authorizing the pardon and parole board to make rules
and regulations; repealing all acts in conflict herewith; and
declaring an emergency."
The act will be known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
and will become effective January 1, 1964. Though discussed
and argued for many years, the soundness of indeterminate sen-
tencing has been fully established by actual experience and
should be beyond question by now.7
In order to review this law, it is necessary to know what
an indeterminate sentence means, its purpose and intended bene-
fit, and its impact upon existing law.
According to BIcx, LAw DicroNAEY, (4th ed. 1951), an
indeterminate sentence is the "imprisonment for the maximum
period defined by law, subject to termination by the parole
board or other agency at any time after service of the mini-
mum period." This type of sentence must be authorized spe-
cifically by statute, otherwise it is invalid.8
The general purpose of statutes providing for an indetermin-
ate sentence is to make the punishment fit the offender rather
than the crime.9 The underlying design of such a sentence is
to subject the offender to reformative influences; to rescue for
useful citizenship one started on a criminal career and thus to
enable -him to assume right relations with society, but such pur-
pose also includes the protection of society from the offender
who has not reformed.' 0
offenses in the courts of the United Stat6s ... which will assist in pro-
moting the equitable administration of the criminal laws of the United
States."
3 Boldt, supra note 1, at 5.
4Id. at 4.
5 Schwartz, supra note 1.
657 OmA. STAT. §§ 353-356 (Supp. 1963).
7 Boldt, supra note 1, at 9.
8 Rush v. State, 24 Ala.App. 256, 133 So. 917 (1931).
9 People v. Ralph, 24 Cal.2d 575, 150 P.2d 401 (1944).
01n re Cowen, 27 Cal.2d 637, 166 P.2d 279 (1946).
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These purposes seem to be in keeping with the trend of
enlightened revision of thought about crime and punishment. It
does appear that truly enlightened penal codes are not seeking
revenge in the name of justice," but are attempting to reform
those capable of reforming and returning them to society.
With the passing of the Indeterminate Sentence Law in Okla-
homa, we are on the verge of such enlightened penal philosophy.
However, the present law arguably contains a serious weakness.
This weakness is that its application is in the discretion of the
court.
Following are excerpts from statutes of three states havin
the indeterminate sentencing law. Such excerpts will be used
to compare features contained therein with the Oklahoma law.
The Iowa code reads:
'hen any person over sixteen years of age is convicted
of a felony, except treason or murder, the court imposing
a sentence of confinement in the penitentiary, men's or
women's reformatory shall not fix the limit or duration of
the same, but the term of such imprisonment shall not ex-
ceed the maximum term provided by law for the crime
of which the prisoner was convicted."'
2
It will be noted that if the defendant is over sixteen and
is convicted of a felony, excepting treason or murder, the court
may not impose a determinate sentence, but rather must impose
the indeterminate sentence.'8
It appears that the Oklahoma law applies only to felonies
even though such is not specifically set out. We can make that
estimation in that the law refers to crimes involving sentencing
in the state reformatory or penitentiary. Such confinement re-
quires the conviction of a felony.14 Perhaps the discretionary
feature of the Oklahoma law explains the absence of any exclu-
sionary felonies. However, the California law is mandatory,15, and
it too fails to specifically exclude any crime from operation of
the statute.
The first part of the Illinois code on indeterminate sentencing
specifically provides for determinate sentencing for the crimes
of misprision of treason, murder, rape, or kidnapping. Then fol-
lowing:
"It is expressly provided that the definite sentence provided
for in this section 'one' shall be applicable only to the crimes
enumerated in this section 'one' and definite sentences shall
not be applicable to any other crime or offense enumerated
11 Boldt, supra note 1, at 5.
1IowA CODE ANN. § 789.13 (West 1958).
13 IowA OPs. ATT'y. GiN. 125 (1911-12).
1421 OxA. STAT. § 5 (1961).
' 5 People v. Kostal, 159 CalApp.2d 444, 323 P.2d 1020 (1958).
WVol. 1, No. I
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in this Act; and further, that indeterminate or general sen-
tences shall apply to all other crimes and offenses enumer-
ated in this Act, but not to the crimes or offenses enumerated
in this section 'one ."'(
It should be noted that the operation of this statute is simi-
lar to that of the Iowa law, however, excluding even more crimes
from operation of the statute.
The California code relative to indeterminate sentencing,
passed prior to 1917 provides:
"Every person convicted of a public offense, for which im-
prisonment in any reformatory or State prison is now pre-
scribed by law shall, unless such convicted person be placed
on probation, a new trial granted, or the imposing of sen-
tence suspended, be sentenced to be imprisoned in a State
prison, but the court in imposing the sentence shall not fix
the term or duration of the period of imprisonment."17
The California code is the broadest of the three statutes thus
far set out, in that no crime is excluded from the statute's oper-
ation, nor is any person excluded from its operation, and it, as
the Iowa and Illinois code, is mandatory upon the court. The
limits of the imprisonment is provided by law and the court's
function after conviction is to sentence to the proper institution.
The fate of the defendant is then in his own hands and those of
the Adult Authority, an administrative agency which does the
actual sentencing. The court cannot be influenced by the heinous
nature of the defendants crime nor is it in any way subjected
to pressure of public opinion. Of course, the agency may receive
this pressure at a later time, but with the passing of time, one's
hatred of the criminal and his crime can be viewed with more
perspective.
Section 1 of the Oklahoma law provides:
"In all cases where a sentence of imprisonment in the peni-
tentiary is imposed, the court in assessing the term of the
confinement may fix a minimum and a maximum term, both
of which shall be within the limits now or hereafter provided
by law as the penalty for conviction of the offense. The
minimum term may be less than, but shall not be more than,
one-third of the maximum sentence imposed by the court.
Provided, however, that the terms of this act shall not limit
or alter the right in trials in which a jury is used for the
jury to assess the penalty of confinement and fix a minimum
and maximum term of confinement, so long as the maximum
confinement be not in excess of the maximum term of con-
finement provided by law for conviction of the offense."'8
16ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 801 (Smith-Hurd 1961).1 7 WsT'S ANN. CAL. PENAL CODE, § 1168 (1956).
18 57 OxLr.A. STAT. §§ 353-356 (Supp. 1963) [Emphasis added.
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Apparently all that the legislature has done is to authorize
the courts to use indeterminate sentencing. Such a position, it
would seem, is bound to lead to inequities in the administration
of justice, for here, with the use of the word may the legislature
has opened the door to the possibility of prejudice, personal
bias, discrimination, and divergent administration of a law, ac-
cording to the court's personal preference.
On this point a Pennsylvania Superior Court felt that the
legislature has exclusive power to set up a penal system and its
administration; further, it can grant such measure of discretion
to the courts as it may deem proper.19 Pennsylvania's indetermin-
ate sentencing law is discretionary with the court.20 Is the law
any less discriminatory simply because the legislature has re-
mained within the limits of its authority in granting discretion to
the court? It is difficult to understand how a law, unequal in
its application, is likely to render justice. One of the primary pur-
poses of the indeterminate sentence law is uniformity of admin-
istration to all prisoners undergoing confinement.
21
Of course, courts throughout the history of the law have
exercised discretion in the administration of justice, and rightly
so, but is it good legislative policy to allow the operation of a
law at the courts discretion? Interpretation of the law and ad-
ministration of justice under the law are proper areas of discre-
tion, but the fact of the law's operation ought not be discre-
tionary with the court.
Under the circumstances, as it exists now, if it were possible
to have two defendants, charged with the same crime, in the
same court, under the same set of circumstances, one defend-
ant could be given a determinate sentence, the other an inde-
terminate sentence. It is hard to see how the rendition of justice
will prevail under this possibility. According to J. Edward Lum-
bard, Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, "Disparities [of sentence] whether real or apparent, create
prison disciplinary problems and in many cases tend to defeat
one of the purposes of sentence-the rehabilitation of the defend-
ant as a useful member of society."22 It would seem better to do
without the indeterminate sentencing law, with all of its humane
features, and continue under determinate sentencing in order
that equal justice be rendered to all charged with a crime.
Section 1 of the act provides in part:
"The court in assessing the term of the confinement may
fix a minimum and a maximum term, both of which shall
be within the limits now or hereafter provided by law
19 Commonwealth ex rel. Green v. Court of Oyer and Terminer and
Quarter Sessions, 176 Pa.Super. 103, 106 A.2d 896, 898 (1954).2 0 PZMN. STAT. ANN., Tit. 19, § 1057 (West Supp. 1962).
21In re Cowen, 27 Cal.2d 637, 166 P.2d 279 (1946).
2 2 Lumbard, supra note 1.
[Vol. 1, No. I
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as the penalty for conviction of the offense. The minimum
term may be less than, but shall not be more than, one-third
of the maximum sentence imposed by the court."
It appears that these two statements are in conflict and cannot
stand side by side. This statute provides that the limits of the
sentence as imposed by the court must be within the limits im-
posed by law, however the minimum sentence shall not be more
than one-third the maximum penalty imposed. As an example
to illustrate this conflict consider a conviction for second degree
manslaughter.
The statute provides:
"Every person guilty of manslaughter in the second degree
is punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary not more
than four years and not less than two years, or by imprison-
ment in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by fine
not exceeding one thousand dollars, or both fine and im-
prisonment."
23
Applying a conviction for second degree manslaughter under
the indeterminate sentencing law we find that if the court imposed
the maximum penalty provided by law, that is four years, such
sentence does not square with the provision of the indeterminate
sentencing act providing that the minimum sentence shall not
be more than one-third of the maximum.
For these provisions to operate together, the determinate
sentences provided by law must be in a ratio of one to three,
that is, the minimum determinate sentence must be at least one-
third of the maximum. Perhaps we are saved from this dilemma
by section five of the act which is the repealer section. This sec-
tion provides "all acts and parts of acts in conflict herewith are
herewith repealed." Does this mean that the indeterminate sen-
tence law repeals the determinate sentencing laws in conflict with
it, or merely stays their operation when the indeterminate sen-
tence is applied?
If we assume that section five resolves the conflict posed
above, the minimum sentence for second degree manslaughter
is one-third of four years or sixteen months. The minimum term
is wholly dependent upon what the court sets as the maximum
with the limitation that the minimum may not be more than
one-third of the maximum sentence imposed by the court (or jury),
but it may be less. In any event, the problem posed here cannot
be resolved on theoretical speculation, but rather, its answer must
await an interpretation by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Ap-
p l Jeryl Q. Looper
28 21 On.,,- STAT. § 722 (1961).
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